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Introduction
The evolution from male-breadwinning production
economies to post-industrial dual-earning knowledge- and
service-based economies necessitated a commensurate shift
in states’ welfare strategies (Bonoli 2005). Consequently,
the European Union and other global regions, inspired
by the Nordic model, speak in terms of social investment
rather than social protection. Whereas social protection
policies aimed to reduce current poverty, social investment
policies aim to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty
(Jenson 2009). The focus is on a knowledge economy
and employment growth, supported by policies enhancing
individuals’ human capital and labor force participation
(Bonoli 2005; Kvist 2014).
Gender is as central to the social investment strategy as it
was to the socio-economic revolution that inspired it. Fami-
lies are less stable, women’s time for unpaid family and soci-
etal care work is no longer in abundance, and employment no
longer insures against poverty at any stage of the life course
(Bonoli 2005; Kvist 2014). In turn, gender differences vis-à-
vis employment and family life are highlighted in the social
investment discourse (Jenson 2009). For example, the Eu-
ropean Commission’s (EC) 2016-2019 strategic engagement
to enhance gender equality aims to reach the EU objective
of 75% female labor force participation rate by 2020 with
a “comprehensive initiative to address the work-life balance
challenges faced by working parents and carers” (European
Commission 2016: 10). The language may be gender neu-
tral, but the challenges remain overwhelmingly women’s.
Others have already raised concerns that the social in-
vestment strategy’s emphasis on employment growth rein-
forces rather than reduces gender inequalities in occupations,
wages, and lifetime earnings (Jenson 2009, 2015; Knijn &
Smit 2009). In this essay I argue the problem derives from
the strategy’s focus on enhancing individual human capital,
and insufficient attention to the organizational contexts that
structure group differences in human capital’s rewards. Key
elements of the EC’s 2016-2019 action plan to enhance gen-
der equality are then contrasted with the organizational pro-
cesses reinforcing gender and other group inequalities. I con-
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clude with suggestions for the necessary research to integrate
organizational dynamics into future gender equality action
plans.
Gender in Evolving
Socio-Economies
Second wave feminism spurred a revolution in which
women demanded equal access to the public spheres dom-
inated by men, as well as freedom from the isolation of
and responsibility for the unpaid work of the family (Jenson
2015). As a result, the latter decades of the 20th Century
witnessed a steady increase in women’s educational attain-
ment, labor force participation, and wages relative to men
(Cooke & Baxter 2010). To support these changes, fertility
and women’s unpaid domestic time decreased, whereas men
modestly increased their housework and childcare (Cooke &
Baxter 2010). The service economy grew to offer low-cost
market substitutes for high-skilled women’s domestic work,
along with employment opportunities for less-skilled women
(Cooke 2011). Liberalization of cultural norms along with
divorce laws resulted in more single-mother families and an
increase in de facto partnerships (Cooke 2011).
These changes created new social risks that strained Eu-
ropean welfare states built around the profound gender in-
equalities of a male breadwinner model (Jenson 2009). The
changing economy made reliance on a single household
earner risky and increased the number of working families in
poverty (Bonoli 2005). Dual-earning couples or single heads
of households needed support for balancing employment and
family demands (Bonoli 2005). At the same time, aging
populations extracted a growing share of state resources for
health and pensions, whereas lower fertility rates threatened
pay-as-you-go pension schemes as well as future economic
growth (Bonoli 2005; Esping-Andersen et al. 2002). By the
late 1990s, renowned academics were urging governments
to adopt a social investment strategy to manage these new
risks (Esping-Andersen et al. 2002; Heckman 2006). Social
investment strategies are employment-focused, with policies
attempting to increase individuals’ human capital and de-
crease barriers to employment participation.
The Lisbon Strategy for 2000 to 2010 incorporated some
aspects of social investment, along with being the first EU
strategy to specify employment objectives, including a 60%
employment rate for women (European Parliament 2010). To
support this, the 2002 Barcelona European Council set tar-
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gets for the expansion of public childcare by 20101. These
objectives suggest a liberal feminist approach to enhancing
gender equality, but ironically the gender equality guideline
itself was removed in the wake of the 2005 strategy review
(European Parliament 2010, 15). In addition, less than half of
the EU member states had met the Barcelona targets by 2010,
owing in part to austerity measures after the 2008 financial
crisis (European Commission 2014).
Still, the European Commission (2016) claimed success
with a 64% average female employment rate in 2014, and
the Europe2020 strategy set an ambitious employment target
of 75% for women as well as men. As indicated in Table 1,
OECD data puts the 2014 average female employment rate in
the EU Member States and Norway slightly lower at 61.8%.
But a comparison of the average percentage point change in
women’s employment pre- and post- Lisbon (bottom row)
suggests the Lisbon strategy had some success. The increase
across countries was 4.9 percentage points between 2000 and
2014, as compared with just 2.7 percentage points between
1990 and 2000.
What Table 1 also reveals are the persistent country dis-
parities in absolute rates as well as their trajectories since
1990. In 1990, the Mediterranean countries and Ireland had
female employment rates below 40%, in contrast to rates
in excess of 70% in Denmark, Estonia, Finland, and Swe-
den. And although the over-time trend is one of increase,
much of the growth has been in women’s part-time employ-
ment. This is apparent when looking at the 2000 to 2014
change in women’s full-time employment equivalent noted in
the final column, which averaged just 2.9 percentage points
across the period. This average includes some decrease in
women’s full-time equivalent employment in Denmark, Fin-
land, Greece, and the Slovak Republic.
More generally, with the exception of Norway, female em-
ployment participation has decreased over time in the Nordic
countries that serve as the exemplars of a social investment
strategy. Neither has the Nordic model eradicated gender
wage gaps, which ranged in 2010 from a low of 8 to 9% in
Norway and Denmark, respectively, to a high of almost 19%
in Finland2. These trends raise questions about whether a so-
cial investment strategy can achieve the ambitious 2020 em-
ployment target, much less gender economic equality. What
is missing from the state-market nexus is consideration of the
organizations in which employment actually occurs.
Bringing Organizations Back In
Stratification researchers have long acknowledged that
individual socioeconomic attainment is embedded within
specific structures, including the family, organizations, and
nation-states. The widespread availability of individual
micro-data has privileged analyses of individual-level deter-
minants as with the social investment strategy, with the cross-
national harmonization of such datasets since the 1980s
facilitating comparisons of individual effects across socio-
political contexts. The cross-national variation in relative
gender equality in employment, work hours, wages, and oc-
cupations highlights the importance of the institutional con-
text in structuring what Acker (2006) termed gender inequal-
ity regimes. Such cross-national comparisons have been used
to suggest the types of policies to increase employment, and
gender equality in employment (e.g., Esping-Andersen et al.
2002).
Acker’s (2006) primary point, however, is that gender
inequality regimes are the interlocked practices replicating
complex gender, class, and other group inequalities within
organizations (see also Acker 1990). Acker is among the
structuralists that reject the economic supposition that the
labor market efficiently allocates wages according to skill
and market demand as assumed by the human capital model.
Instead, labor process and new structuralist perspectives
coalescing under relational inequality theory (Avent-Holt
&Tomaskovic-Devey 2014) assert that wage inequalities re-
sult from local social relations that allocate rewards within
establishments (Baron & Pfeffer 1994; Tilly 1998). Indeed,
organizations, not labor markets, are the site of employment
relations, wage-setting, as well as compliance with any na-
tional equality directives. In turn, organizations’ gender in-
equality regimes do reflect the surrounding society’s politics
and culture (Acker 2006). Yet Lazear and Shaw’s (2008)
comparative study analysing linked employee-employer data
revealed significant and similar variation in wage inequalities
across firms within divergent socio-political contexts.
What analyses of organizational dynamics reveal is that
gender inequalities are seldom produced by firms paying
gender wage differentials for the same job; instead, the dis-
parities result from the sorting of women and men into differ-
ent jobs. These are popularly referred to as glass ceilings (oc-
cupational sorting) and glass doors (establishment sorting).
For example, analysis of Norwegian register data found that
most of the motherhood wage penalty among white-collar
workers was accounted for by mothers sorting into lower-
paying occupations and establishments (Petersen, Penner &
Høgnes 2014). In contrast, Norwegian men’s partnership and
parental premiums were accounted for by their sorting into
higher-wage occupations prior to the family transitions (Pe-
tersen et al. 2014).
Similar sorting has been found to account for much
of the gender wage gap in other countries (Anderson
&Tomaskovic-Devey 1995; Javdani 2015; Petersen and Mor-
gan 1995). Those from a human capital perspective would
say these reflect individual choices, even if choice is shaped
by family constraints. Correll and her colleagues’ (2007)
field correspondence study, however, found that employers
discriminated against similarly-qualified mothers in callback
rates to job applicants.
As highlighted next, serious consideration of organiza-
tional sorting is absent from the Commission’s 2016-2019
strategic engagement for enhancing gender equality (Euro-
pean Commission 2016). This may account for the slow
1 Provision of childcare for 33 % of children under 3 and 90 %
of children between 3 and mandatory school age.
2 Figures from the OECD gender data portal,
http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=54751, accessed 5
August 2016.
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Table 1
Female Labor Force Participation Rates over Time (age 15 to 64).
1990 1995 2000 ppt ∆ 2005 2010 2014 ppt 4 ppt 4 2000-
1990-2000 2000-2014 2014 in FTE*
Spain 31.8 32.5 42.0 10.2 52.5 53.5 52.0 10.0 6.2
Italy 36.2 35.4 39.6 3.4 45.4 46.8 47.5 7.9 3.6
Ireland 36.6 41.5 53.7 17.1 58.2 56.0 56.4 2.7 0.4
Greece 37.5 38.0 41.7 4.2 46.0 48.0 41.1 -0.6 -1.9
Belgium 40.8 45.4 51.5 10.7 53.8 56.5 57.9 6.4 6.0
Luxembourg 41.4 42.2 50.0 8.6 53.7 57.2 60.5 10.5 8.6
Netherlands 47.5 53.9 62.7 15.2 64.1 69.4 68.1 5.4 3.1
Hungary 45.9 45.9 49.6 3.7 51.0 50.2 55.9 6.3 5.0
France 50.9 52.0 54.8 3.9 58.4 59.7 60.9 6.1 5.6
Poland 51.8 51.8 48.9 -2.9 47.0 52.6 55.2 6.3 6.7
Germany 52.2 55.3 58.1 5.9 59.6 66.1 69.5 11.4 6.6
Slovak Republic 53.0 53.8 51.5 -1.5 50.9 52.3 54.3 2.8 -0.2
Latvia 53.8 53.8 53.8 0.0 58.2 59.0 64.3 10.5 6.9
Portugal 53.9 54.0 60.5 6.6 61.6 61.0 59.6 -0.9 0.4
Slovenia 58.4 58.4 58.4 0.0 61.3 62.6 60.0 1.6 -2.2
Austria 58.9 58.9 59.4 0.5 61.1 65.7 66.9 7.5 1.4
Czech Republic 61.0 61.0 56.9 -4.1 56.3 56.3 60.7 3.8 2.6
UK 62.8 62.5 65.6 2.8 66.7 65.3 67.8 2.2 3.0
Switzerland 66.0 66.0 69.3 3.3 70.4 72.5 75.1 5.8 4.1
Norway 67.2 68.8 74.0 6.8 72.0 73.3 73.4 -0.6 1.2
Denmark 70.6 67.0 71.6 1.0 71.9 71.1 69.8 -1.8 -4.6
Estonia 71.9 60.6 57.3 -14.6 62.8 60.7 66.2 8.9 6.9
Finland 71.5 59.0 64.5 -7.0 66.5 66.9 67.9 3.4 -0.8
Sweden 81.0 70.9 72.2 -8.8 71.8 69.7 73.2 1.0 1.5
AVERAGE 2.7 4.9 2.9
Source: OECD stats; *indicates change in full-time equivalent (FTE) employment rates between 2000 and 2014, except for the Czech
Republic, Finland, Sweden, where it is the change between 2005 and 2014.
progress in narrowing gender wage, earnings, and pension
gaps, as well as the proportion of women in senior decision-
making positions. A larger concern is that some of the key
action plans have been shown to exacerbate sorting.
The 2016-2019 EU Strategy vis-à-vis Organiza-
tions
Two priorities in the Commission’s 2016-2019 strategic
plan are to reduce gender pay, earnings, and pension gaps
and, relatedly, increase economic independence for women
and men (European Commission 2016). The strategy for re-
ducing the pay gaps includes the only nod to sorting in the
document, with an objective of reducing gender inequalities
in sectors and occupations (European Commission 2016, 24).
The specific action plans, however, focus on increasing to-
day’s and future women’s human capital to compete in male-
dominated sectors: “use the Grand Coalition for Digital Jobs
to support measures enhancing women’s and girls’ digital
skills and promoting female employment in the ICT sector
and awareness-raising on educational and vocational training
choices” (European Commission 2016, 25).
Reducing gender differences in skills is an important
long-term element of reducing gender economic inequalities.
However, doing so will only serve to frustrate women—and
perhaps induce a female brain-drain from Europe—if women
remain blocked from jobs and firms that utilize and reward
these skills accordingly. The employment action plans for
increasing women’s economic independence do not address
these sorting barriers. Instead, the action plans primarily aim
to achieve and extend the Barcelona targets for public provi-
sion of care, introduce new leave and flexible work arrange-
ments, and encourage more equal use of these by men and
women (European Commission 2016, 10-11).
The problem with these action plans vis-à-vis organiza-
tional dynamics is that the greater availability of such poli-
cies increases high-skilled women’s exclusion from lucrative
private sector occupations as compared with women in coun-
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tries with less or no policy supports (Mandel and Semyonov
2006). Other research finds employers stigmatize workers
when they use available flexibility options, with the penal-
ties harshest for professional men (Williams, Blair-Loy &
Berdahl 2013).
These findings highlight the persistence of an ideal worker
model within organizations as an inherently masculine
worker unencumbered by familial responsibilities (Acker
1990). The action plans to encourage men to assume more
unpaid care tasks or take more available family leave offer
no suggestions for changing this organizational norm that
discourages men from doing so. This may contribute to the
time diary finding that the increase in men’s unpaid domes-
tic work across countries stalled in the late 1980s or 1990s
(Kan, Sullivan & Gershuny 2011, 236). Without attending
to organizational dynamics, the current action plans cannot
reach their stated goals, and women and their children will
continue to be at greater risk of poverty.
Conclusions
Gender equality has been at the heart of the European
Union agenda since the Treaty of Rome and the rhetoric of it
remains in the social investment strategy. Enhanced human
capital and policies for reconciling work and family, how-
ever, create a two-legged equality stool. Action plans need
to address the critical third leg of organizational processes
that structure group differences in returns to human capital,
in part by sorting workers. The legislative route to combat
discriminatory sorting is positive discrimination, which is al-
lowed under the 2006/54/EC directive on the implementation
of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of
men and women in matters of employment and occupation.
Yet many countries have argued against positive discrimina-
tion because in principle it violates men’s rights to equality
(Cooke 2011).
As a small but critical first step, the Commission should
draw on the growing availability of linked employee-
employer panel data as analysed in Lazear and Shaw (2008)
to better understand which organizational factors narrow
group and particularly gender differences in the rewards to
human capital when fashioning the strategy for 2020 and be-
yond. Only then can a fuller suite of action plans be devel-
oped to achieve not only high-skilled employment growth,
but also more equal sharing of its rewards.
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